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This dissertation develops and tests a theory of how entrepreneurial teams develop 
relational capital – or relationships characterized by trust, identification, and obligations – 
and the impact of this relational capital on the teams’ performance. I begin by identifying 
the challenges to relational capital development posed by the lack of social structure in 
the new venture context. I identify the gap in our understanding of the mechanisms 
through which entrepreneurial teams develop relational capital. Study 1 is a longitudinal 
qualitative study of relationships in entrepreneurial teams in new technology ventures. 
Findings suggest that teams in which members cared about each other and cared about 
preserving the relationship were characterized by higher-quality relationships than team 
that did not exhibit such caring. However, the findings also suggested that caring was not 
enough. Teams that supplemented caring with systematic communication practices that 
increased explicitness and transparency about goals and actions were better able to 
preserve the quality of their relationships in light of the challenges they faced as a new 
venture. Based on the findings of this qualitative study and building on research on inter-
personal and inter-organizational relationships, I develop a theoretical framework for 
relational capital development and the impact of relational capital on performance. 
Specifically, I argue that the combination of communal relational schemas – caring about 





explicit and transparent – enable entrepreneurial teams to develop trust, identification, 
and obligations. These forms of relational capital are hypothesized to increase creativity, 
resilience, and coordination in entrepreneurial teams. I test my hypotheses with a mail 
survey of high-technology entrepreneurial teams. The findings suggest that communal 
relational schemas and contracting practices both are positively associated with trust and 
obligations on the team and have no relationship with identification with the team. Trust 
and obligations were also found to be positively associated with creativity, resilience and 
coordination. Trust and obligations partially mediated the relationships between 
communal relational schemas and contracting practices on creativity, resilience, and 
coordination.  
The two studies in the dissertation contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by 
offering the apparently paradoxical combination of communal schemas and contracting 
practices as a means through which entrepreneurs can overcome the unique challenges 
associated with the new venture context. Specifically, by structuring their relationships 
through both communal schemas and contracting practices, entrepreneurs can 
compensate for their lack of an existing social structure. By highlighting communal 
schemas, it challenges prevalent portrayals of entrepreneurs as individualistic and self-
interested. By incorporating contracting, the present perspective challenges the notion 
that formalizing commitments hurts entrepreneurs’ ability to be agile and adaptive. As 
such, it has important implications for how entrepreneurial teams go about thinking about 









“Forming a new company is like starting a romantic relationship. The early phase 
is emotionally volatile. You have to build confidence, establish a sense of fairness 
and balance. If one person feels he is investing more of his feelings, without 
reciprocation, the situation can quickly get out of hand, resulting in stormy mood 
swings ultimately leading to disaster. Continual contact and reassurance are 
essential” (Kaplan, 1994: 19).”  
 
Most new ventures are started by entrepreneurial teams (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). 
In high-technology industries, the prevalence of team-based new ventures can be as high 
as 70% (Francis & Sandberg, 2000). Teams can better handle the complexity inherent in 
today’s increasingly global, competitive, and knowledge-based economy (Birley & 
Stockley, 2000; Kamm, Shuman, Seeger, & Nurick, 1990). Yet, not all team-based new 
ventures reap the benefits of the variety in skills, knowledge, resources, and networks of 
their members. The nature of the relationships between the team members, their relational 
capital, affects their ability to mobilize these potential sources of advantages to shape a 
viable future for the new venture. Studies have shown that the quality of entrepreneurial 
team relationships positively influence both objective performance (e.g., Chowdhury, 
2005; Ensley & Pearce, 2001; Ensley, Pearson, & Amason, 2002) and perceived 
performance (e.g., Watson, Stewart, & BarNir, 2003; Watson, Pontheiu, & Critelli, 1995; 
West, 2007).  
Compared to teams within organizations, entrepreneurial teams face unique 





For the most part our knowledge about how entrepreneurial teams develop relational 
capital is limited. Current research on entrepreneurial teams focusing on prior ties and 
demographic homogeneity has offered insight on possible structural antecedents to 
relational capital. However, it has only implicitly addressed the cognitive and behavioral 
underpinnings through which relational capital develops. Moreover, it has produced 
mixed empirical findings. The goal of this dissertation is to address this gap in our 
understanding. It presents a mid-range theory of how team-based new ventures develop 
relational capital in light of their unique challenges and the implications of this relational 
capital for their performance. 
As with all mid-range theories, the proposed framework is applicable under 
particular assumptions. The first assumption is that the new venture is team-based: a 
group of two or more individuals with an equity stake in the new venture that is involved 
in its creation and management (Forbes, Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn, & Sapienza, 2006). 
Though I use “team” to be consistent with previous research in entrepreneurship (e.g., 
Birley & Stockley, 2000; Ensley et al., 2002; Kamm et al., 1990; West, 2007), my use is 
aligned with Hambrick’s (1994) use of the term “group” and does not necessarily connote 
integration, cohesion, or a strong group identity. The second assumption is that the new 
venture is a startup, a time period that spans from initiation, when the entrepreneurs 
decide to form a business venture, to takeoff, the time when the new venture can operate 
without the external support of its initiators. The new venture draws its resources, 
competencies, and technology from the entrepreneurial team and external sources (Van 
de Ven, Angle, & Poole, 1989). In this phase, the primary focus of the entrepreneurial 





rather than on the activities involved in the growth, maintenance, or change of established 
organizations (Gartner, 1993; Kazanjian, 1988). The third assumption is that the new 
venture is knowledge-based, which means that it develops and markets new products or 
services based upon proprietary technology or skills (Heirman & Clarysse, 2004; 
Talaulicar, Grundei, & Werder, 2005). Compared to manufacturing, retail, or other low-
technology industries, knowledge-based new ventures face greater ambiguity, as 
knowledge work is relatively non-programmable (Schultze, 2000).  
In Chapter II, I present an overview of the importance of relational capital for 
entrepreneurial teams and the unique challenges to relational capital development posed 
by the new venture context. I also review existing literature on relational capital 
development in entrepreneurial teams and identify the gap I seek to fill. In Chapter III, I 
present Study 1, a longitudinal qualitative study of 27 entrepreneurs exploring the 
mechanisms through which entrepreneurs create and leverage relational capital in their 
entrepreneurial teams and the role of previous ties in this process. Chapter IV presents a 
theory of relational capital development based on combining communal schemas and 
contracting practices and their effect on team performance. Chapter V presents Study 2, 
which tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter IV. Chapter VI offers a discussion of 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON RELATIONAL CAPITAL AND 
ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAMS 
 
Researchers have shown an increasing interest in how teams can impact new 
venture performance (e.g., Chowdhury, 2005; Ensley & Pearce, 2001; Ensley et al., 2002; 
Watson et al., 2003; Watson et al., 1995; West, 2007). This research suggests that the 
nature of the relationships between the team members, or their relational capital, matters. 
For example, Chowdhury (2005) found that team processes explained 44% of sales 
growth beyond control variables such as the demographic heterogeneity of the team.  
WHAT IS RELATIONAL CAPITAL? 
Relational capital (also referred to as relational embeddedness) entails the assets 
that are created and leveraged through relationships, such as trust and goodwill 
(Granovetter, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). It is a form of social capital in that 
relationships are a resource for attaining individual and collective goals (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). Whereas relational capital is about the nature or quality of the 
relationship, the structural dimension of social capital (or structural embeddedness) deals 
with the extent to which actions and outcomes are influenced by the overall network of 
relations. It concerns the value of the position an actor occupies in the network, and 






Relational capital can compensate for low levels of structural social capital. For 
example, those without advantageous network configurations can attain desired outcomes 
by strengthening the quality of certain relationships (e.g., Westphal & Stern, 2006). 
Likewise, the absence of relational capital can be detrimental even if people have high 
levels of structural social capital. Maurer and Ebers (2006) discuss examples of 
entrepreneurial biotechnology firms whose performance suffered because founders were 
unable to adapt their relational capital to their changing task environments. In the less 
successful firms, founders maintained strong relationships with their scientist peers rather 
than strengthening their relational capital with other members of their networks, such as 
venture capitalists. Thus two founders can have similar network configurations, but based 
on differences in the nature of their relational capital, their performance outcomes differ. 
Like other social capital constructs, the relational capital of the dyads that compose the 
team generalize to the team level, such that relational capital becomes a property of the 
collective (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 1988). 
REVIEW OF THREE FORMS OF RELATIONAL CAPITAL AND THEIR 
BENEFITS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAMS 
 
In this dissertation I focus on three forms of relational capital that are particularly 
beneficial for the quality of entrepreneurial team’s processes: trust, identification, and 
obligations. In their seminal paper, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) identified four types of 
relational capital – trust, identification, obligations, and norms. I only focuses on the first 
three types of relational capital. Norms are socially defined guidelines about appropriate 
and inappropriate actions that represent a degree of consensus in the social system 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). They are structural characteristics that are independent of 





elaborated in a later section, new ventures lack a social structure and are thus unlikely to 
form such a consensus until they become more established. The norms that influence 
entrepreneurial team members are more likely to be professional or occupational rather 
than organizational (Maurer & Ebers, 2006).  
Trust involves accepting vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, 
Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Trust is seen as a component of both cohesion, or the degree of 
attraction between entrepreneurial team members (Ensley et al., 2002), and commitment, 
or loyalty to the entrepreneurial team (Chowdhury, 2005). Trust is an asset in 
entrepreneurial relationships in that it increases entrepreneurs’ propensity to share 
information, which means that the team can mobilize its resources, such as time, effort, 
attention, and knowledge more effectively (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003). Trust 
also increases the likelihood that entrepreneurs respond favorably to each others’ actions, 
reducing detrimental emotional conflict on the team (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Ensley et al., 
2002). Trust creates a safe environment for team members to express differences of 
opinions without the conflict becoming emotional or personal (Ensley & Pearce, 2001). 
Indeed, studies have found that trust can mitigate the negative effects of differences of 
opinion in entrepreneurial teams (Talaulicar et al., 2005) and is associated with new 
venture sales growth (Chowdhury, 2005; Ensley et al., 2002).  
The second form of relational capital is identification, the extent to which 
individuals see themselves as one with the team and incorporate it in their self-concept 





coordination, and helping (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Tyler, 1999). It also 
leads people to consider the needs of the group when making decisions (Simon, 1976).  
Finally, felt obligations entail team members’ commitment to perform certain 
activities in the future (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Obligations facilitate the 
performance of entrepreneurial teams by creating a sense among entrepreneurial team 
members that they can rely on each other (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Moreover, felt 
obligations increase the self-control and proactivity exhibited by team members (Grant & 
Ashford, 2007). In contrast, a low sense of obligations on the team may distract 
individuals from task performance, as concerns about lack of accountability prompt team 
members to check up on each other. Indeed, obligations have been found to facilitate 
entrepreneurial team performance by mitigating uncertainty about whether team members 
will perform according to expectations (McGrath, MacMillan, & Venkataraman, 1995). 
As a result, entrepreneurial teams with obligations benefit from the knowledge and 
abilities of their members.  
WHAT HELPS RELATIONAL CAPITAL FORMATION? 
Research suggests that social structure and the organizational setting facilitates 
relational capital development in organizational teams. As argued below, these 
antecedents of relational capital are largely unavailable to entrepreneurial teams. 
Moreover, current research on the antecedents of relational capital in entrepreneurial 
teams is inconclusive, leaving many unanswered questions about the mechanisms 






Social structure consists of the values and behavioral expectations that prescribe 
to people what is appropriate behavior in a given social situation (Scott, 1998). Social 
structure reflects (1) the extent to which people know how to interpret what happens to 
them in the situation and how to behaviorally respond to these interpretations (i.e., they 
have schemas or generalized procedures for the situation (Sewell, 1992)) and (2) the 
extent of consensus among people in the situation about these schemas (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997; Sewell, 1992). Thus social structure is high when people are clear about 
and agree on how to interpret and act on events in a particular social situation.  
Social structure serves several functions. It generates regularity of behavior by 
constraining individuals’ behavioral choices, reducing variance in behavioral responses, 
and diminishing the influence of individual goals, experiences, and dispositions (Scott, 
1998). At any moment there are a multitude of alternative possible actions an individual 
may take. Social structure narrows down these numerous alternatives. The difference 
between social structure and norms is that social structure regulates behavior through the 
existence of schemas and agreement on these schemas, whereas norms regulate behavior 
through the existence of sanctions for violators (see Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). Second, social structure provides meaning, labels, and justifications for 
organizational experiences and actions (Weick, 1993). Structure stabilizes meaning by 
fostering shared interpretations among organizational members, thereby reducing the 
experience of equivocality. Equivocality is the extent to which data are unclear and 
suggest multiple interpretations (Weick, 1979). Social structure reduces equivocality by 
providing a shared sense of appropriate interpretations of data and behavioral responses 





the face of non-routine events. As Ranson, Hinings, and Greenwood (1980: 5) write, 
shared interpretations enable organizational members “to recognize, interpret, and 
negotiate even strange and unanticipated situations, and thus continuously to create and 
reenact the sense and meaning of structural forms during the course of interaction.” When 
social structure exists, individuals inherit explanations for what they are doing, which 
means that they need not construct them continually (Weick, 1995).  
Compared to established organizations, many new ventures lack an established 
social structure. Often, entrepreneurs must learn and create their roles while on the job 
and while working with unfamiliar co-workers, board members, investors, customers, and 
suppliers (Stinchcombe, 1965). They lack important information and thus they may lack 
confidence. They may not know where to look for answers or even what questions to ask 
(Amason, Shrader, & Tompson, 2006). Accordingly, they are less likely than members of 
established organizations to agree in their interpretations of what is happening to them 
and their behavioral responses to events. Entrepreneurs are still guided by their 
expectations from occupational communities, past experiences, their dispositional 
behavioral tendencies, broadly shared institutional templates, and cultural norms for 
organizing (Aldrich, 1999), all of which lead them to interpret their situations and behave 
in particular ways. In the absence of social structure, however, there is no consensus 
among entrepreneurial team members about how to organize. The new venture context 
itself does not provide clear guidelines. The personality, experience, and set of 
expectations that each person brings to the endeavor are unique and entrepreneurial team 
members’ behavior is more likely to express their individual uniqueness rather than a 





established the new venture’s social structure, the more difficult it can be for the 
entrepreneurial team to develop relational capital. 
Lack of social structure hurts trust development. We know from research on the 
antecedents of trust that misunderstandings fuel mistrust, as they lead to unmet 
expectations concerning the other’s behavior (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Studies show that 
entrepreneurial team members are diverse in their underlying belief structures (West, 
2007), tacit knowledge (Beckman, Burton, & O'Reilly, 2007), and goals (Sine, 
Haverman, & Tolbert, 2005). Without a social structure to align their interpretations and 
action, misunderstandings, attribution problems, and divergent conceptions are likely to 
ensue, making trust more difficult to develop (Stinchcombe, 1965). Prior research also 
documents that behavioral consistency fosters trust, whereas inconsistency undermines it 
(Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Without an organizational structure to 
foster behavioral consistency, the climate of trust on the team may be undermined. Lack 
of structure may be particularly detrimental for establishing trust early in the 
entrepreneurial team’s functioning because team members’ information about each other 
is incomplete (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). As a result, they experience 
equivocality in evaluating each others’ behavior, which increases concerns about each 
others’ motivation and goals (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006). 
Lack of social structure also hurts the development of identification with the 
team. Individuals identify with social groups to reduce uncertainty about their own social 
standing (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Social structure can increase identification with the team 
by making salient one’s role in the team and why it is important, thereby facilitating role 





better one’s understanding of one’s role in the collective, the more one is likely to 
identify with it (Smidts, Pruyn, & van Riel, 2001). Indeed in a recent series of field and 
laboratory studies, Hogg et al. (2007) demonstrated that when people are uncertain, they 
prefer to identify with, and identify more strongly with, groups that are more distinctive 
and more clearly structured. Lack of structure weakens this basis for identification with 
the team.  
Finally, lack of social structure hurts the development of obligations. Stable and 
enduring roles and authority relations enhance the clarity and visibility of mutual 
obligations. As Coleman (1990: 313, quoted in Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 257) writes, 
“organizations ordinarily take the form of authority structures composed of positions 
connected by obligations and expectations and occupied by persons.” The greater the 
extent of social structure, the greater people’s experience of “prescriptive clarity,” 
whereby they have clear sense of what to do. In this way, social structure increases 
people’s likelihood of acting in accordance to the priorities, perceptions, resources, and 
obligations specified by the group (March & Olsen, 2006). Without social structure, these 
bases for obligations are absent, making this type of relational capital elusive for 
entrepreneurial team members.  
Organizational Settings 
Research also suggests that trust, identification, and obligations increase with a 
group’s embeddedness within a larger organization—an advantage that startup teams 
lack. For example, people working in a corporation develop trust toward one another as 
they accumulate detailed information about their colleagues over time (Gabarro, 1987; 





people have to demonstrate their investments and reciprocity in the relationship—all of 
which foster trust (Blau, 1964/1986). Organizations facilitate this process of trust 
development by providing interaction routines that allow individuals to demonstrate their 
trustworthiness and predictability (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Closure is another 
antecedent of trust. In the absence of personal information, membership in the same 
social group, such as an established organization, can generate positive beliefs about 
trustworthiness (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). Finally, organizations provide 
institutional safeguards, such as organizational rules and regulations, that can further 
build trust by engendering predictability in employees’ behavior (McKnight et al., 1998).  
Identification is known to increase to the extent that identifying with a social 
collective reduces people’s uncertainty about their place in their social world and/or 
enhances their self-esteem (Tajfel, 1978). Organizations serve as identification targets for 
people by establishing clear membership boundaries and highlighting the organization’s 
distinctiveness and internal homogeneity, thereby reducing uncertainty (Hogg & Terry, 
2000). Teams within organizations provide members with a clear internal structure, a set 
of common goals, and a perceived common fate, which also facilitate identification with 
the team (Hogg et al., 2007). Moreover, organizations can enhance group members’ self-
esteem—and thus identification—through their reputation in the industry and business 
arena (Dutton et al., 1994). People take pride in being part of a well-respected company, 
and a team operating within such an organization may bask in reflected glory.  
 Finally, several aspects of organizational life can strengthen mutual obligations on 
a team. These include a history of exchanges (Blau, 1964/1986), people’s fear that they 





roles (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964). The more longstanding and 
stable the social relations in a particular organization, the clearer the obligations among 
members of that organization (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Moreover, social norms in 
established organizations are collectively enforced, as people monitor each other and 
sanction those who violate the norms (Coleman, 1988). Finally, stable and enduring roles 
and authority relations enhance mutual obligations.   
A team setting out to found a new company lacks many of these organizationally 
provided sources of relational capital. Members have not yet established routines or 
procedures that ensure ongoing interaction (Stinchcombe, 1965). Even if team members 
have worked together before in a different context, that experience may not be relevant to 
their new endeavor. Team members with a prior relationship may behave differently than 
expected once the new venture gets rolling, and that can damage the development of trust 
(Berscheid & Ammazzalorso, 2001). Likewise, identifying with the entrepreneurial team 
can prove difficult. True, entrepreneurial teams often share a perception of common fate 
and distinctiveness. Yet by virtue of being new, they lack a clear internal structure that 
provides members with certainty about their social standing. Moreover, team members 
cannot bask in any reflected glory from a larger organization’s outstanding reputation. 
With respect to obligations, neither roles nor sanctions can account for obligations in 
entrepreneurial teams, since these are not well developed. Most nascent ventures have not 
yet defined agreed-upon “ways of doing things around here,” which can leave members 
with little sense of obligations. Moreover, team members’ history of exchanges may 
either be non-existent or irrelevant for the new venture context, and is thus unlikely to 





Relational Capital Development Outside of Organizations  
Given the lack of social structure entrepreneurship teams face, are there any 
conditions that help them develop trust, identification, and obligations? Some studies of 
relational capital in entrepreneurial teams have explored prior ties and demographic 
homogeneity as alternative sources of trust, identification, and obligations. Team 
members with prior ties (for example, they worked together at a previous company before 
going into business together) have a relationship history with established patterns of 
interrelating (Gabarro, 1987). As a result, they are likely to trust each other, identify with 
the team, and feel a sense of mutual obligation (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). And 
those who are similar in age, gender, functional background, and other demographic 
characteristics may interact more frequently and see themselves as members of a distinct 
group, which can further enhance trust, identification, and obligations (Beckman et al., 
2007).  
However, most entrepreneurial teams comprise some members who have prior 
ties and some who do not (Forbes et al., 2006). At the direction of the board of directors 
or the venture-capital firm funding the startup, a new company’s founders may add team 
members based on the skills they bring to the table, with little regard for whether these 
individuals know one another (Wijbenga, Postma, & Stratling, 2007). Moreover, many 
entrepreneurs deliberately strive for demographic diversity in assembling their team. 
They know that such diversity can increase the range of perspectives and experiences 
available to the team for creative problem solving. A demographically diverse team also 
brings a more varied set of external networks, improving members’ access to valuable 





entrepreneurial teams as well (MacMillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985). Yet diversity can 
create problems—in the form of miscommunication and misinterpretation of colleagues’ 
behaviors and communication.  
Despite their advantages, prior ties and demographic homogeneity are no 
guarantors of success for a new venture. One recent study (Beckman et al., 2007) found 
that functionally homogeneous teams were less able to attain an initial public offering 
and venture-capital funding than heterogeneous teams (see also Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990). We do not know why some teams with prior ties or demographic 
homogeneity still fail or how teams without these structural antecedents can still develop 
relational capital. The next chapter presents a qualitative study that explores the 
mechanisms through which entrepreneurial teams develop relational capital and the 






STUDY 1: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF RELATIONAL CAPITAL IN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAMS  
 
This qualitative study identifies the mechanisms that enable entrepreneurial teams 
in new ventures to develop relational capital. As reviewed in the previous chapter, these 
mechanisms are not well-understood. Most prior research on relational capital 
development in teams is based on organizationally-embedded teams working within the 
context of a social structure. Research on entrepreneurial teams has largely focused on 
structural antecedents, namely prior ties and demographic homogeneity, without 
identifying the processes through which relational capital can form, both in the presence 
of these antecedents and in their absence. 
A second goal of this study is to explore the role of prior ties in the relational 
capital development process. This goal was motivated by the conflicting findings in 
previous literature on the implications of prior ties in entrepreneurial teams. On one hand, 
research suggests that when entrepreneurial team members have prior ties, they are likely 
to have learned how to get along and communicate, which can enable them to perform 
better (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). For example, teams with common company 
affiliations share a language and vision that allow them to easily implement and routinize 
activities (Beckman, 2006). In contrast, teams without previous experience together may 
face extensive conflict due to misunderstandings, slow decision speed, problems of 





entrepreneurs with previous ties may exhibit more trust, cohesion, and unity of direction 
(Zahra, Yavuz, & Ucbasaran, 2006).  
On the other hand, strong ties may not be as beneficial as they are common. For 
example, strong ties sometimes lead people to choose personal considerations over 
business ones in making decisions. They can increase errors of judgment, obscure 
rational decision making, and discourage risk taking, as entrepreneurs become more 
interested in maintaining their social relationships at the expense of business rationality 
(Zahra et al., 2006). Another source of performance problems is that entrepreneurial team 
members with prior ties are likely to have overlapping and redundant competencies and 
insufficient diversity for high-quality decision making (Francis & Sandberg, 2000; Ruef 
et al., 2003). Entrepreneurial team may lack differences in perspectives, which may hurt 
performance (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Team members may also lack significant 
new information (Ruef, 2002). Entrepreneurs with prior ties may think too much alike, 
ignoring other sources of information and not considering alternatives (Zahra et al., 
2006). Thus they may lack the ability to innovate and learn (Birley & Stockley, 2000; 
Zahra et al., 2006). Indeed, Maurer and Ebers (2006) found that strong norms among 
people with prior ties sometimes lead to relational and cognitive lock-in and impedes new 
ventures’ ability to adapt to changing task environments. Prior ties may also prevent 
entrepreneurial team members from communicating enough about their expectations 
from the work relationship (Watson et al., 1995). In other words, they may assume more 
common ground than is actually there and refrain from engaging in productive process 
discussions (Watson et al., 1995). Finally, prior ties may result in inadequate monitoring 





Informal, ad hoc, and loose controls may produce faulty or incomplete information about 
the progress being made, thereby preventing needed help, support, and corrective actions 
(Zahra et al., 2006). In fact, Ruef (2002) concluded that effective and creative 
entrepreneurs spent less time interacting with friends than networking with a diverse 
group that includes acquaintances and strangers.  
The divergent literature on this topic suggests that entrepreneurs can most benefit 
from creating and leveraging the relational capital typically associate with prior ties 
without suffering from their costs. However, our understanding of how entrepreneurial 
teams can achieve this benefit (or advantageous situation) remains limited. As 
demonstrated by the literature review in Chapter II, researchers in the field have focused 
on structural antecedents such as prior ties but have not examined the particular behaviors 
and cognitions that help create and leverage relational capital. This study, therefore, 
addresses these questions: What are the mechanisms through which entrepreneurs create 
and leverage relational capital in their entrepreneurial teams to facilitate new venture 
performance? And what is the role of prior ties in this process? 
METHODS 
Data Collection 
I chose an inductive qualitative approach in light of my goal to build theory about 
the mechanisms through which entrepreneurs working in teams create and leverage 
relational capital. I selected interviewees following the purposeful sampling guidelines of 
Lincoln and Guba (1985). That is, I selected individuals because I believed that they 
would provide insights relevant to my research question (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), yet I 





themes or patterns that capture core experiences (Patton, 1990). Because my goal was to 
generalize to theory, not populations, I selected cases for their potential to generate 
insight, not their representativeness (i.e., theoretical sampling, see Glaser and Strauss, 
1967).  
I built the sample using multiple sources. I recruited interviewees through 
acquaintances and used snowball sampling techniques by asking, at the conclusion of 
each interview, for suggestions of other potential interviewees who had recently started a 
company with others. Moreover, I took steps to interview entrepreneurs from different 
geographical areas and in various industries.  
My sample consisted of 27 entrepreneurs in 20 knowledge-based startups, 
including 6 entire founding teams. I conducted follow-up interviews 6-8 months later 
with 20 of the entrepreneurs and about 18 months after the initial interview with 13 of 
them. Respondents were not included in the follow-up if they were unavailable for the 
interview. In some cases, respondents were not interviewed in the third wave because the 
company had ceased to exist or they had left the company following the first wave and I 
had already interviewed them in the second wave. The startups ranged in age from one 
week to five years since founding and represented various industries, including Internet 
commerce, biotechnology, and software. Entrepreneurial teams ranged in size from 2-5 
members. Thirteen respondents were from the San Francisco area and 14 were from large 
and small cities in the Midwest. Twenty-five were men. Table 1 lists information about 
each of the 20 companies, including how many team members were interviewed, how the 





Study 1 Company Information 
 







Age at time 
of first 
interview 




Status How met 
1 2 2 yes 5 months communication 
software 














dissolved n/a n/a all three 
worked 
together at a 
previous startup 













in tact one team 
member knew 
both others, the 
other two did 
not know each 
other 
4 1 2 no 6 months small engines $200K 
from 
family 
8 months in tact, 
received 
$900K grant 

































Age at time 
of first 
interview 




Status How met 
6 2 2 yes 6 months consulting self 8 months dissolved n/a n/a casual 
friendship 
7 1 3 no 13 months biological research $2M in 
grants 























8 1 5 no 23 months software for 
automotive industry 
$500K n/a had been 
sold at time 
of first 
interview 








17 months in tact. Raised 
additional 



















Age at time 
of first 
interview 




Status How met 
10 1 4 no 23 months Internet platform $1.3M in 
venture 
capital 























11 1 3 no 14 months technology for 
entertainment 

























7 months one founder 
took on 
another job 
and was only 
minimally 
involved. 




called up and 
invited the 















Age at time 
of first 
interview 




Status How met 
13 1 4 no 24 months real estate software self and 
family 





16 months struggling two founders 
knew each 
other from a 
previous job. 









n/a n/a 16 months received 







other from a 
previous job. 




15 2 2 yes 3 years web hosting 
services 
self 7 months in tact 16 months in tact, one 
founder moved 







16 1 2 no 1 week Digital music 
software 
self 8 months in tact, 
raised 
money 
16 months in tact through 
mutual friend 
17 1 2 no 15 months Innovation support angel and 
VC 
n/a n/a n/a from website 



















Age at time 
of first 
interview 




Status How met 
18 1 5 no 2 years geology grants  7 months in tact, 
research 
progressed 






19 1 5 no 2 weeks internet-based 
software 
family n/a n/a n/a from website 





20 1 3 no 12 months Online wine 
application 
n/a n/a n/a n/a from website 







All of the initial interviews were conducted in person and all of the follow-up 
interviews were conducted by phone. The interviews lasted from 90 to 120 minutes and 
were transcribed verbatim. The interview protocol was based on my research questions. 
Accordingly, questions focused on how they met their team members, how they formed 
the company, and how their relationships facilitated or inhibited their work. Sample 
questions include: Can you tell me about a time when the team was functioning really 
well? Can you tell me a story of a time when one of them helped you work better?  Can 
you tell me a story of a time when one of them made it difficult for you to do your work?  
Can you give some examples of the kinds of things you do 
Analysis 
to help them work better? The 
interview protocol is included in Appendix A.  
The analysis consisted of several stages in accordance with grounded theory 
techniques (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The first stage was open coding of the interviews. 
I read through the transcripts and attached codes to units of text in a manner that was as 
open and inclusive as possible. For this stage I applied standard practices for coding 
qualitative data analysis to build coding categories inductively (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). For example, I used labels taken from the respondents’ language, or in vivo codes, 
rather than concepts that had associations for me (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The analysis 
and codes focused on identifying qualities of the relationships described (e.g., trusting, 
conflictual), attitudes toward the other people (e.g., caring), practices adopted in the 
relationship (e.g., communication practices), and evidence for how the team worked 
together (e.g., coordinated). The second stage entailed comparing to each other the 




category: its dimensions, the conditions under which it is pronounced or minimized, its 
major consequences, and its relation to other categories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The 
third stage of analysis entailed examining each company as a case and writing a case 
study for each company in my sample (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The case descriptions are 
included in Appendix B. This analysis enabled me to utilize the longitudinal data and to 
examine how processes unfolded over time. Also, whereas the first two stages were 
aimed at articulating a theoretical framework, the third stage enabled me to evaluate and 
refine the framework. I was able to evaluate the validity of my emerging theoretical 
framework in the context of each company.  
FINDINGS 
The findings are presented to address the two research goals of this study. I begin 
with my findings on the mechanisms for creating and maintaining relational capital. I 
then discuss my findings on the role of prior ties in these processes. 
Mechanisms for Creating and Maintaining Relational Capital in Entrepreneurial 
Teams 
 
What differentiates teams that appear to possess relational capital from those who 
do not? Two themes emerged from the data. The first theme reveals that some teams are 
connected by a bond created by caring for each other’s needs and mutual concern for 
preserving the relationship for its own sake. The second theme highlights implementation 
of contracting practices that enhance explicitness and transparency regarding team 
members’ goals and activities. I begin by presenting the results about caring. 
First Theme: Caring about Needs and the Relationship 
Some entrepreneurial teams exhibited more caring about each other’s needs, 




unique circumstances. The following example is from a team composed of an 
experienced entrepreneur and four undergraduate students,  
“There’s one guy [on the team] who is going to take a leave of absence from 
school. He’s from Guatemala. He wants to go back to Guatemala so I’ve been 
very flexible. We’re going to pay for trips back and forth. I’m going to give him 
his first two weeks of salary before he’s actually worked for two weeks. Lending 
him money to buy the equity, you know. I’m doing what I can to make life easier 
for him.” (S25) 
 
As the quote suggests, the informant is willing to expend valuable resources to 
accommodate the unique needs of this team member. 
Another example of accommodation to a partner’s needs even at the expense of 
business rationality comes from a two-person startup team. One of the team members 
lives in Germany, while the second team member quote below, lives in Silicon Valley, 
“One of [my partner’s] biggest concerns was being forced to fly, which he just 
hated. He couldn’t sleep for one day before the flight and one day after the flight. 
He was scared all the way in the aircraft. It was a big thing for him. On the other 
side, from a business perspective [Silicon Valley is] just the right place to be… I 
said [to investors] ‘You have to take into account that Kenny will at most come 
three times a year to the U.S. It could be two.’ I made that a pretty prominent 
point and just respected that. He liked to see that I was fighting for his 
objectives.” (S23) 
 
Another manifestation of caring was respect for team members’ non-work lives. 
For example,  
“There are times when your family will need you and it doesn’t matter what work 
means; you have to be there. And that should trump. And we don’t want to work 
in an environment where folks are constantly seeking approval to go be with their 
sick kid. Go be with your sick kid.” (S2) 
 
Caring teams exhibited social and instrumental support. This support directly and 
indirectly enabled team members to succeed in their organizational tasks, while also 




the following entrepreneur reflected, “Everything else stops if one of my team members 
needs something from me… because I am here to support them in their success.” (S27) 
Finally, caring entailed the taking on of vulnerability. As one experienced entrepreneur 
commented, 
“How the hell are you going to develop a great love relationship unless you can 
open yourself up so much so that yes, if the guy is a jerk you are going to be badly 
hurt and if you can’t open yourself up to that then Oh well. And I think that’s true 
in business relationships if they’re going to be really, really close entrepreneurial 
types of things” (S14). 
 
By opening up and exposing himself to the possibility of being hurt, he sends a message 
to his partners that theirs will be an intimate rather than an arm’s length relationship. 
As these quotes suggest, some entrepreneurs were aware of the importance of 
caring on the team. Many respondents explicitly compared their relationships with their 
team members to romantic relationships with the associated commitment and caring: 
“I joke about this now and then: I have my girlfriend partner and my business 
partner, I have two partners. And it’s funny, there are all these parallels in the 
relationships. Sort of similar landmarks of levels of trust and commitment.” (S21)   
 
“I think it’s very similar to my challenges in my own personal relationships. [In 
my marriage] we choose to move forward because we trust each other, we love 
each other, we know what skill sets we bring into our marriage. It’s the same in a 
company. And I think very much in a start up. If you have it, you have a greater 
chance of success. We very much trust. I think we do love each other as friends 
and partners.” (S8) 
 
Caring benefitted the teams in my sample. In the following example of a 
university spin-off, the attitude of caring facilitated a more open relationship between the 
entrepreneurial team members: 
“Toward the end of one of our meetings with the professors [who invented the 
product and were on the entrepreneurial team], I was saying, ‘Here’s the way we 
want to approach this type of project with you. The only way we’re going to find 
out if this is going to be a truly great, the whole is greater than the sum of the 




hand poker, you always know what all our cards are, and we will meet you 70% 
of the way and see if you meet us back.’ And you see these little glances and then 
they came into the next meeting, and they were just all – the body language was 
so palpably different, it was so cool, they were smiling, they were shaking hands 
with two hands, embracing our hands. It was just, ‘We are so glad to be working 
with you guys – you’re just so cool.’ And they just completely opened up. You 
know, stuff they were holding back on before.” (S14)  
 
 In contrast, other teams adopt a more instrumental approach to their relationships, 
viewing them as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves. For example, the 
following entrepreneur explains his approach toward his partners, 
“With all my partners, it’s not an equal partnership in the sense that it’s always 
my idea. .. I always have more percentage. And it’s always somebody that I 
brought that I thought can run the business but at the same time, the idea and the 
vision was mine. So the truth is that a lot of times I do tell them what to do. I 
mean, even with my partners, a lot of time they are more like my employees.” 
(S1)   
 
This partnership ended before the conclusion of the study.  
The following example also highlights the potential negative effects of such an 
approach among team members. The attitude of the partner speaking in the quote below 
reflects opportunism. As a result, the partnership (and the venture) almost came to an 
end: 
“I kind of look at all of these things - academics or industry - as a series of four-
year projects. The specifics of how you basically fund that in some ways is 
secondary. So I kind view this company as really just a vehicle to see if this idea 
will work… I was developing this other project and ironically the same week that 
we turned in the Phase II grant application [for the startup], I found out this other 
project was getting funding. By that point I felt like I was committed [to the other 
project]. So when we find out a couple of weeks later that we had gotten Phase II, 
at that point it looked like I was going to be leaving the company. This would 
have created a huge problem because I was a co-PI [principle investigator] on the 
grant and if I was leaving the company it would put the grant in jeopardy. There 
was a matter of replacing me. I mean whether or not you find somebody who 
would make the same sacrifice that I had made was questionable and Mitch 
probably could not do the project alone. As it turned out the funding for the other 




because I think Mitch saw that I was willing to leave… So I think he was a little 
angry at that if the funding hadn’t fallen through, I would have done that.” (S24)   
 
In this case, the speaker was willing to leave his partner, thereby jeopardizing the new 
venture, to follow an attractive alternative opportunity. His description of the events 
reveals an opportunistic approach and a lack of caring for his business partner. Even the 
speaker is aware that even though he stayed on, the viability of the new venture was 
jeopardized by the affect on his willingness to leave on his partner’s feelings. 
 These examples suggest that caring may be an important mechanism through 
which entrepreneurial team members strengthen the quality of their relationships on the 
team, thereby increasing their capacity to succeed in the difficult task of creating a new 
venture. The bond and communal sentiment, as well as the goodwill generated by 
responsiveness to needs, increase team members’ commitment to stay together through 
inevitable challenges and facilitated mutual trust. In a situation characterized by 
uncertainty about the future, an emotional “leap of faith” may actually reduce the 
partnership’s riskiness by increasing their collective capacity to deal with the challenges 
ahead of them.  
Second Theme: Contracting Practices 
The data suggest a second theme, a set of behaviors that also help build and 
maintain relational capital on the teams. The data from both the in-tact and dissolved 
teams suggest that contracting practices, or practices that make commitments explicit and 
transparent, are an important complement to caring in new venture teams.  
Contracting serves several relationship-building and relationship-maintaining 
functions. First, contracting practices at the beginning of the entrepreneurial process, 




values, thereby facilitating alignment on these important factors. It facilitates a “soul 
searching” process (S26), allowing partners to open up about their values and 
expectations. Often the discussions also include spouses and significant others, whose 
support is instrumental to the team’s success. One entrepreneur reflected on some of the 
issues he discussed with his partner in the course of this process, which took about three 
months and involved both partners’ spouses,  
“Is this going to be something that we spend time for 18 months or 3 years or 5 
years and is this company eventually going to get bought out by someone? Is this 
an acquisition target?... There was also the compatibility thing. We wanted to 
make sure that Bob and I could stand each other as people because we’re going to 
be spending a lot of time together so we had to make sure we weren’t going to 
drive each other crazy.” (S26) 
 
As the end of the quote suggests, the contracting process served as a means for partners 
to get to know each other and assess the likelihood of working well together. The 
contracting process entailed not only exchanging information but also served as a trial 
period that indicated whether they could embark together on the intense and intimate 
journey of new venture formation. In the following quote, a respondent tells about the a 
priori contracting process between him and his partner, who was initially a stranger,  
“We started discussing what my role would be, what the equity allocation would 
be for everybody, what his role would be, our vision for the strategy of the 
company, our vision for the financing strategy, and so forth. We really just hit it 
off. The guy [the inventor] is amazing. He’s going to be a superstar.” (S25) 
 
Sometimes this process results in a mutual understanding that the partnership is 
not a good one. For example, a respondent told of a potential partnership that did not 
work out. In their initial discussions, it was revealed that her potential partner’s values 
about entrepreneurship were significantly different from hers:  
“I’m grateful that the partnership dissolved then… I wanted to create an 




was sustaining and satisfying to our team members and created a great return on 
investment for my investors. That is what I care about. Those are the values that I 
came to the table with… And I think she really saw it as a much smaller 
opportunity financially because we were looking at a narrow space. Financially I 
think she thought it was too small of an opportunity for herself… for me it’s not at 
all about the money.” (S27) 
 
Value-congruence is an important component of trust and goodwill (Mayer et al., 1995) 
that is revealed by contracting practices, as partners learn about each other’s values and 
goals.  
In the following example, a partnership in which team members exhibited caring 
eventually dissolved because of divergent views of the goals of the company. The 
partners had not engaged sufficiently in a priori contracting about this topic. As one of 
the partners tells,  
“I realized we had a diversion of goals and it took me a while to realize and then 
articulate to myself and to Mark what my concern was, which is that he has made 
it very clear all along that he is interested in building something great… and in the 
next breath he said ‘If this doesn’t work out, time is wasting. I am in the prime of 
my career and I will be building something great somewhere and I’m hoping this 
will end up being the platform for that but it may not.’… [for me] for financial 
reasons and just for stress reasons, this is not sustainable. The business model 
doesn’t seem to be sustainable from my perspective.” (S14) 
 
Whereas the respondent’s partner’s goals were long-term and focused on building 
something great, the respondent’s goals were more short-term and financial. This goal 
incongruence drove them apart despite having spent significant time and resources on the 
venture and despite the fact that it was meeting its goals at the time of dissolution. 
A priori contracting is also important for bringing up and resolving questions 
about equity. Several teams exhibited unresolved tensions around how ownership was 
distributed among team members. Those who lacked a mechanism for talking explicitly 




his share of the company’s equity did not fairly reflect his efforts and contribution. Yet he 
and his partners failed to discuss it. He said,  
“We just don’t talk about it. I don’t know how healthy it is. But when you have to 
work with somebody ten hours a day every day, I mean we often work weekends 
too so it’s like we see so much of each other. Unless you really sort of deal with it 
and come to a resolution, I think we both feel like there is no sense in having a 
nasty work relationship.” (S24) 
 
This partner’s assessment of the situation reveals a relationship where his dissatisfaction 
with the equity distribution could not be addressed because the relationship was not open 
enough to allow a discussion of this issue. The respondent acknowledged that equity 
distribution should have been dealt with up front. “People don’t want to deal with 
everything right in the beginning. They say, ‘Oh, we don’t know. We got to put that off 
because we don’t know yet. But to the extent possible [it’s better to] try to define 
everything from the beginning.” 
 The second kind of contracting occurred in the day-to-day interaction among team 
members. It entailed revisiting the terms discussed in the initial phase of contracting. One 
respondent told of how they revisit the strategy and goals they set at the outset, 
“You want to engrain that strategy into all your daily decision making. So 
whenever we discuss like shall we put our time on this customer or this customer, 
we go back and say, “What’s our strategy, which customer is the good customer?” 
(S23) 
 
 Day-to-day contracting also served to align partners for the ongoing operations of 
the startup. For example,  
“[We have] an Excel spreadsheet that talks about finance and operations, 
marketing, sales and maybe some miscellaneous things. And it has what needs to 
get done and who’s responsible for it and then there’s a date and a detail… and if 
you can’t get it done in that week and it’s in red, then you send me or Jake, “I 
need to push this date back,” right?  So it’s not so much that you have to hit the 





In the absence of social structure and formal roles, the transparency created by such 
working tools helps the team progress toward its goals. Moreover, by reducing surprises 
and increasing accountability toward goals, such day-to-day contracting can help prevent 
disappointments, which can be damaging to relationships.  
The following is an example of how the absence of day-to-day contracting can 
engenders negative feelings about the team’s coordination and performance,  
“There are times that I get the feeling that I’m spending a lot of time and energy 
on things that aren’t the right things to spend time and energy on that aren’t going 
to actually advance us. I was going to say we don’t have any formal process for 
assessing this… Day-to-day is basically just gut feeling. There are some things 
that feel like distractions and are. I’m usually aware when I’m working on those 
and I usually get really frustrated and annoyed by them eventually.” (S21) 
 
Because of the unstructured nature of the startup experience, day-to-day contracting can 
prevent partners from losing direction, wasting resources, and experiencing frustrations 
and performance failures. The following example is illustrative, 
“I developed guidelines for expense reporting and things like that. Here are the 
things you can expense; here is how you do it. Here is what you have to keep 
track of for IRS. That helped a lot because then when you get into those situations 
you don’t have to get angry because you expected something and somebody 
expected something else. That still happens but the more you define up front 
about the way things need to work if there is an issue [the better]. And the other 
thing that is important is not to assume that there won’t be any issues. It is better 
to assume that there will be conflict, a lot of it, and to try to define how you want 
to work through it. Because you will have conflicts.” (S12) 
 
As is apparent from the quote, this contracting practice was motivated by an awareness of 
the possibility of divergent expectations and conflict. 
  Contracting practices are facilitators of communication and alignment. They also 
offer entrepreneurs a safe mechanism to deal with the emotional aspects of the 
entrepreneurial experience. As the following example suggests, contracting can help cope 




“I always keep a list of the top ten things that will kill this company and anybody 
can go up and nominate another one and we decide where it’s going to be but it’s 
all of the things we worry about the most.  It’s a way to get those worries out in a 
group setting when you don’t want to sound stupid… it also makes it very easy to 
say ‘We’ve got to address these top three. What are we doing to address these? 
Does anybody have any new ideas about these top three?’” (S19) 
 
  Contracting practices furthermore counteract the potentially negative aspects of 
caring, such as less accountability or insufficient monitoring. The following quote from a 
team that had dissolved is illustrative: 
“I probably did not step back soon enough to take a look at what are we really 
missing. I treated my partners as business owners and wanted them to take 
leadership in their own areas of expertise… Because of the partnership, I was 
reluctant to treat Harry as an employee and I should have treated my partners 
more as employees [when asked to elaborate, he continued] Employee discussions 
would be ‘Let’s talk about the product specifically’ and’ I’m going to hold you 
accountable for your area of responsibility. We are going to set milestones and 
you need to deliver against them.’ Well that is an area that I’m typically very 
good at, because I think I did not make a strong enough separation between 
partner and employee, I didn’t push hard enough… I think because of the 
friendship or the level of respect that was between us that may have been a blind 
spot for me.”(S8) 
 
Interestingly, the interview with “Harry” indicated that he was not aware of the 
informants’ concerns, which reinforces the finding in the literature that cohesive teams 
are less likely to bring up difficult issues (Zahra et al., 2006). 
 In sum, these findings suggest that a combination of caring and contracting 
practices helped the entrepreneurial teams in my sample create and leverage the benefits 
of relational capital without suffering potential costs, such as inhibited conflict, lack of 
accountability, and insufficient monitoring. I explored the relationship between caring 
and contracting and firm outcomes by evaluating the evidence of caring and contracting 
for each of the companies as high, medium, or low. A team was characterized as low 




rather focused on the partners’ role and benefit for the firm. Medium-caring teams were 
ones in which respondents exhibited concern for others’ needs, but the caring was not a 
major overarching theme in the interview. High-caring teams were ones in which 
respondents repeatedly expressed concern for the others and explicitly spoke of the 
relationships as ends in themselves. The level of contracting was evaluated based on how 
respondents described the extent of explicitness and transparency of their expectations 
and activities. Low contracting teams specifically described themselves as ad hoc in their 
communication about expectations and activities. Medium contracting teams had some 
practices in place, and/or had done some a priori contracting, but there was still many 
substantial points of vagueness with respect to each others’ goals, priorities, activities, 
and timelines. Finally high contracting teams were ones who implemented systematic 
practices that maintained open and continuous communication about goals and activities.  
Of the eight companies in which at least one team member left over the course of 
the study, seven had exhibited low caring, 6 had exhibited low contracting, and 5 had 
exhibited both low caring and low contracting. All eight had exhibited either low caring 
or low contracting. Of the three companies that had dissolved, one had exhibited low 
caring. Of the nine companies that had remained intact and continued, only two exhibited 
low caring and only one exhibited low contracting. These findings suggest that caring and 
contracting played a role in the fate of the team and its ability to remain intact. 
The Impact of Prior Ties 
The teams in my sample came together in diverse ways. In some teams, prior ties 
existed among all team members, in some there were no prior ties at all, and in a third set, 




prior ties formed either because a group wanted to start a business together, not 
necessarily caring what the business was, or because an individual had an idea for a 
business and looked for partners only among people he or she knew well, such as friends, 
former co-workers, or family. In the case of no prior ties, individuals searched for 
potential partners with complementary skills and common interests and found them either 
through acquaintances or through impersonal searches, such as through Craig’s List. 
Groups with a mix of ties usually started out as a team with prior ties who added 
members to complement their skills. 
 In my sample, 8 companies formed through prior ties, 7 companies formed 
through no prior ties, and 5 companies formed through a mix of prior ties and no ties. In 
all three categories, some companies dissolved by the time of the second or third data 
collection whereas others were continuing on a path to success. Table 2 outlines the fate 
of the companies based on how the team had formed. As the table indicates, prior ties 
among all team members or among a subset of teams members did not necessarily 
provide an advantage over teams lacking prior ties in the team’s likelihood to stay intact 
16-18 months after the beginning of the study.  
TABLE 3.2 
Prior Ties and Fate of Startup 
 
 Prior Ties No Prior Ties Mix of Prior and 
No Prior Ties 
Team In Tact, 
Startup Continues 
4 (companies 12, 
15, 17, 18) 
2 (companies 16, 
20) 





2 (companies 1, 8) 3 (companies 4, 5, 
11) 
3 (companies 3, 7, 
13) 





The data also indicate that prior ties do not necessarily imply that team members 
exhibited caring, though sometimes they did. Some teams with no prior ties exhibited 
caring (such as companies 16 and 20) and some companies with prior ties were low on 
caring (such as companies 6, 8, and 18).  
Several respondents reflected on the advantages and disadvantages of prior ties 
and sometimes addressed explicitly how contracting can buffer them against the 
liabilities of prior ties. For example, one respondent reflected on what she had learned 
about going into business with friends: 
So it would be to have the conversation really initially of, “Here’s my style.  
Here’s our culture. Here are my expectations in partnering with you. What are 
your expectations in partnering with me? And how are we going to make this 
work? What values are we going to preserve in our friendship and not let them 
trickle over?” (S27) 
 
As this quote suggests, contracting can be a means of preserving the caring in a prior-tie 
relationship. This insight also applies to the case of S24, whose team had not contracted 
adequately about equity distribution. The data revealed that this failure in contracting 
contributed to the erosion of a fifteen-year relationship. The following is an example of a 
team with prior ties whose extensive contracting around equity helped preserve the caring 
in the relationship:  
So for instance there’s always issues about how to dispute disagreements between 
partners. That’s a key question. Again, it’s at least a catalyst to bring up issues 
like how you value each other, how you consider each other, how you also plan to 
work together because it’s also about control. It’s not only about how do we 
distribute the benefits at the last day but it’s also about what control do you have 
over the other so can I be fired by him or can I fire him.  You set the tone. So we 
did have quite some discussions.  It was a long time to get to the point where we 
ended up splitting equally which is quite surprising since he worked 5 years on it 
already and I didn’t… That was certainly one point that we wanted to talk about. 
The other is like finding the right market segment and making the right 





Prior ties offer benefits in terms of interpersonal knowledge (knowing how the other 
thinks and works) and trust in the other’s competence and goodwill. Nonetheless, the data 
suggest that in the absence of contracting, these benefits are not enough to sustain 
positive relationships on the team.  
DISCUSSION 
This qualitative study of how entrepreneurial teams build and leverage relational 
capital suggests that (1) prior ties may not lead to relational capital if they are not 
accompanied by caring and contracting (2) entrepreneurs with no prior ties can develop 
relational capital by adopting an attitude of caring toward their team members, and (3) 
entrepreneurial teams are more likely to survive in the early stages of new venture 
formation when caring is supplemented by contracting practices.  
The data further the existing debate in the literature about the costs and benefits of 
prior ties for entrepreneurial teams. The findings of this study do not go against findings 
that prior ties translate to better working relationships based on prior interpersonal 
knowledge and common language or that teams without prior ties may suffer from 
misunderstandings (Beckman, 2006; Birley & Stockley, 2000; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990). They do indicate, however, that these benefits may not be realized 
if teams fail to implement mechanisms to facilitate open discussions about difficult or 
tacit issues, such as each others’ goals and the status of tasks and activities. These 
contracting practices help offset the liabilities of prior ties, such as avoiding conflict in 
the interest of relationship maintenance (Zahra et al., 2006), lack of communication about 




progress and performance (Zahra et al., 2006), and strong norms that prevent adaptation 
to changing circumstances (Maurer & Ebers, 2006).  
The finding that prior ties and caring are decoupled is surprising in light of the 
literature that assumes that prior ties are associated with greater trust, cohesion, and other 
forms of relational capital (e.g., Zahra et al., 2006; Birley & Stockley, 2000). Further 
investigation is warranted into when and why embedded actors with prior ties may 
behave opportunistically toward one another. The findings of this study may help explain 
why sometimes entrepreneurs with prior ties are unable to leverage the benefits 
associated with these to succeed, whereas other entrepreneurs may successfully build an 
organization they started with relative strangers. This appears to be an important area for 
future research.  
This study’s findings about caring are complemented by social psychological 
research on situations of relational interdependence and uncertainty. Entrepreneurial 
teams represent a relational reality characterized by high mutual joint interdependence, 
covariation of interests, extended temporal duration, and high uncertainty in the situation. 
Moreover, entrepreneurial situations usually benefit from making significant investments 
in the relationship. Such relational situations generate high concern for relationship 
maintenance because of reliance on the partners (Kelley et al., 2003). Entrepreneurs may 
be motivated to apply an attitude of caring toward their team members because of the 
high uncertainty of their situation and because founding partnerships are difficult to 
dissolve (Klein, 2005).  
This study suggests that caring about each other’s needs and concern for 




building relational capital among entrepreneurial teams. It also suggests that leveraging 
relational capital entails some use of impersonal organizing mechanisms. Impersonal 
organizing mechanisms arise from structural sources such as laws, norms, and roles and 
are relatively immune to changes in the identity of the individual. As Zucker writes 
(1977: 729), “Any act performed by the occupant of an office is seen as highly objectified 
and exterior. When an actor occupies an office, acts are seen as nonpersonal and as 
continuing over time, across different actors.” In his classic analysis of organizational 
influence, Simon (1976: 187-188) also addresses the notion of impersonal organizing 
mechanisms, writing that “when a person is behaving impersonally, then, an 
organizational value scale is substituted for his personal value scale as the criterion of 
“correctness” in his decisions.”  
These impersonal practices appear to be important complements to caring, as they 
provide a structural source of accountability. We know about the benefits of contracting, 
or formalization, for organizational performance since Weber’s (1947) treatise on 
bureaucracy and the influential work of the Carnegie School (e.g., March & Simon, 
1958). Making explicit roles and routines helps overcome individuals’ cognitive 
limitations. Because of new ventures’ “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), some 
degree of formalization helps them perform better. A recent study of new firms in the 
highly turbulent Internet sector provides preliminary support for the benefits of practices 
such as formalization in new ventures. Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch (2006) found that in 
new ventures, where a dynamic task and external environment would suggest that 




formalization, functional specialization, and administrative intensity, was in fact 
associated with greater performance in terms of revenue. 
The next chapter builds on the insights generated by this study to develop a 
theoretical framework of relational capital development in entrepreneurial teams. It draws 
on the social psychological and anthropological literature on personal relationship to 
develop arguments on how communal relational schemas, which capture the present 
findings about caring, help the performance of entrepreneurial teams. It also draws on the 
literature on inter-firm relationships to develop arguments for how contracting practices 





A MODEL OF RELATIONAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter I build on the findings of Study 1 to present a mid-range theory of 
relational capital development in team-based new ventures. This theory delineates how a 
certain kind of cognition – communal relational schema – coupled with a certain kind of 
behavior – contracting practices – can build relational capital in entrepreneurial teams 
and thereby facilitate the team’s performance. By structuring their cognitions and 
behaviors, communal schemas and contracting practices enable entrepreneurial teams to 
overcome the specific challenges they face. Communal schemas structure entrepreneurs 
as a community bound together by bonds of caring, whereas contracting structures 
entrepreneurs as an organization tied by bonds of commitment. The former structures 
how entrepreneurs think about each other, the latter structures how they act toward each 
other. Moreover, together, communal schemas and contracting practices compensate for 
each one’s liabilities. As such, they represent a process through which teams can create 
relational capital when they are engaged in the act of creating an organization. 
COMMUNAL RELATIONAL SCHEMAS 
Research on interpersonal relationship suggests that people apply specific 
relational schemas toward relationship partners and that these schemas influence the 
nature and development of relationships (Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000). They 
represent the type of relationship the person desires from another and are used to interpret 




include a self-schema for how the self is experienced in the relationship, a parallel 
schema for the partner, and an interpersonal script or expected pattern of interaction 
(Baldwin, 1992). Relational schemas are cognitive structures that organize how people 
think about their relationships. Although they are cognitive, each kind of relational 
schema is associated with certain behavioral manifestations and expectations (McGraw & 
Tetlock, 2005). Thus relational schemas structure people’s expectations, interpretations, 
and behaviors toward others (Baldwin, 1992; Fiske, 1992). By “structure” I mean that 
they constrain and align interpretations and regulate behavior, reducing the possible 
options individuals are likely to exercise (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). Relational schemas 
are important in understanding personal relationships because they shape expectations, 
thereby shaping each person’s own behavior as well as partners’ behavior and the nature 
of interactions. Because of the self-fulfilling nature of expectations in personal 
relationships, relational schemas are often mutual (Reis et al., 2000). 
Relational schemas differ based on their implications for how benefits and 
resources are allocated in the relationship (Clark & Mills, 1979; Fiske, 1992). Relational 
schemas provide a decision rule for resource allocation. In a seminal paper, Fiske (1992) 
identified four basic relational schemas that are prevalent across cultures. In the equality 
matching schema, benefit allocation is governed by egalitarianism, in-kind reciprocity 
and balance; in the authority ranking schema benefits are allocated according to 
precedence, hierarchy, and status; in the market pricing schema proportionality 
determines allocation according to a common scale of ratio values (such as money); and 
in the communal schema giving is based on perceived need and for the purpose of 




example, in an entrepreneurial team deciding how to allocate vacation time among team 
members, an equality matching schema will lead the team to rotate taking a week off. An 
authority ranking schema will give precedent and first choice of dates and length of 
vacation to the team member who has the greatest ownership stake or the highest ranking 
position (e.g., the CEO). A market pricing schema may reward team members with 
vacation time for important accomplishments, such as securing a certain amount of 
funding or meeting an R&D milestone. Finally, a communal schema will result in 
allocating vacation time to the team member who needs it most – the one who is most 
burnt out or whose child is ill.  
Which relational schema will be appropriate in a given relational context depends 
on certain properties of the situation. Specifically, interdependence theory (Kelley et al., 
2003; Rusbult, Kumashiro, Coolsen, & Kirchner, 2004) holds that the nature of 
interdependence in a relationship determines which kind of relational schema is most 
adaptive. According to these authors, several properties of the relationship determine 
which schema is most functional, including the degree of dependence of partners on one 
another, the mutuality of the dependence, whether the outcome depends on joint or 
unilateral action, covariation of interests, the temporal duration of the relationship, and 
the extent of uncertainty. Although Kelley and other interdependence theorists did not 
develop their theory in the entrepreneurial context, an analysis of the entrepreneurial 
team context based on interdependence theory criteria leads to several conclusions. 
Entrepreneurial teams represent a relational reality characterized by high mutual joint 
interdependence, covariation of interests, extended temporal duration, and high 




significant investments in the relationship. Such relational situations generate high 
concern for relationship maintenance because of reliance on the partners (Kelley et al., 
2003). Also, because dependence often entails vulnerability, these situations may inspire 
motivated forms of cognition such as positive illusions and downward social comparison 
(Rusbult et al., 2004). Specifically, interdependence theory predicts that in these 
situations people are likely to apply a communal relational schema. As Kelley et al. 
(2003: 380) write, “People should be driven to develop communal sharing rules in 
domain of their environment in which they are subject to the whims of fate.” Research on 
other highly uncertain interdependent situation supports the notion that successful 
adaptation entails communal relations. For example, Shils and Janowitz (1948) argue that 
the isolation and danger faced by German soldiers in World War II, coupled with 
intensity of interpersonal contact, facilitated their intimacy and closeness, thereby 
reducing desertion and improving their combat performance. Likewise, Shirom (1976) 
concluded that the most important determinant of combat performance in the Israeli army 
is the need-based social support soldiers receive from each other.  
The findings from Study 1, reported in Chapter III, present evidence that some 
entrepreneurial teams adopt communal relational schemas (henceforth, communal 
schemas) toward each other. The data suggest that they thought and talked about their 
partners in ways that expressed concern for their needs and wellbeing. Communal 
schemas rather than other kinds of schemas appeared to underlie their supportive 
behavior. Published accounts of entrepreneurial teams also support the existence of 
communal schemas in entrepreneurial teams. An example comes from Vermeer 




the interest of forming the venture, but quickly came to care about each other. As co-
founder Randy Forgaard said about his co-founder Charles Ferguson, “Charles is 
extremely protective of the Vermeer family and what we have built. He is always on 
guard against unscrupulous partners [and] overly greedy VCs” (Levenson & Nanda, 
1997: 4). Another example of communal schemas in an entrepreneurial team comes from 
Federal Express, which was founded on principles of caring and compassion for people. 
One of the early hires tells of the concern co-founder Fred Smith expressed for her as a 
single mother, “No one at American [her former employer] cared about my situation. I 
was just overwhelmed by Fred’s compassion and by the atmosphere of the company” 
(Frock, 2006: 66). 
In communal relationships, benefits are given to fulfill the other person's needs or 
to express a general concern for the other person. As Blau (1964/1986: 6) writes, 
individuals in communal relationships, where both partners adopt communal schemas 
toward each other, “often do favors for one another not in the expectation of receiving 
explicit repayments but to express their commitment to the interpersonal relation and 
sustain it by encouraging an increasing commitment on the part of the other.” Communal 
schemas entail a sense of belonging, mattering, and commitment to being together 
(McMillan & Chavis, 1986). Under these conditions, individuals become part of a 
community of fate (Stinchcombe, 1965), regardless of whether they have an established 
relationship. Thus, communal schemas can temporally precede relational capital, as 
people can be communal even toward relative strangers. Communal schemas are a matter 




feels for the other’s welfare and the greater the concern with maintaining relationship 
health (Mills, Clark, Ford, & Johnson, 2004).  
COMMUNAL SCHEMAS AND RELATIONAL CAPITAL 
 Below I present arguments about the impact of communal schemas on relational 
capital. Specifically, I argue that communal schemas facilitate the development of trust 
and identification but can inhibit the development of obligations.  
Trust 
Communal schemas influence interpretations and behaviors in predictable ways 
that increase trust on the team. Because thinking communally about another means caring 
about his or her needs, communal individuals are likely to be other-interested, rather than 
strictly self-interested (McGinn & Keros, 2002). They are more likely to pay attention to 
the other’s needs (Clark, Mills, & Corcoran, 1989), give others benefits in response to 
these needs (Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Milberg, 1987) and feel good when helping the 
other (Williamson & Clark, 1989). These forms of social support increase perceived 
trustworthiness (Whitener et al., 1998). In the new venture context, this can mean 
noticing that a team member is discouraged and giving him a “pep talk,” helping a team 
member with her presentation skills, or accommodating and forgiving mistakes.  
Communal schemas also increase trust by facilitating interpersonal coping with 
the intense and sometimes negative emotions generated by the entrepreneurial 
experience. People who are communal are more likely to express emotions and are more 
accepting of emotional expressions by others (Clark, Fitness, & Brissette, 2001). 
Emotional expression communicates that partners’ trust each other with information 




advantage of their weaknesses (Clark et al., 2001). Moreover, because expressions of 
negative emotions are more likely to engender expression of support when people are 
communal, communal teams may reap the benefits of task conflict without suffering 
detrimental relationship conflict that can hurt trust (Ensley et al., 2002). Although 
communal teams may still experience tensions, blaming, and finger pointing, these are 
less likely to tear them apart because of the intimacy, openness, and mutual concern on 
the team (Ensley et al., 2002). 
Communal schemas and the behaviors they engender thus substitute for social 
structure in developing trust. When communal, individuals convey valuable information 
about themselves through emotional expression and self-disclosure. These 
communicative acts increase team members’ knowledge of each other’s motivations, 
goals, and interpretations and decrease the agency misattributions and misunderstandings 
that can undermine trust. In addition to increasing trust by others, communal schemas 
lead people to be more trusting of others. They lead to motivated cognitions, whereby 
relationship partners cast others’ intentions, abilities, and behaviors in a more positive 
light (Kelley et al., 2003). Thus communal schemas reduce concerns about goal 
incongruence, the other’s competence, or free riding, and increase the belief that 
relationship partners are acting in the interest of the relationship.  
These arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Communal schemas among entrepreneurial team members are positively 





Adopting communal schemas toward teammates can also lead to greater 
identification with the team. The self disclosure and emotional expression associated with 
communal schemas mean that team members are more likely to treat each other as 
individuals, based on unique personal characteristics, rather than stereotypically as 
representative of social groups (e.g., “engineers”), which increases identification between 
them (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007). The closeness that communal schemas bring about leads 
relationship partners to include each other in their selves in the sense that the other's 
perspectives, resources, and identities are to some extent their own (Aron, Aron, & 
Norman, 2001).  
Communal schemas also can generate social comparisons that strengthen 
identification. As a result, communal teams are more likely to derogate alternative 
relationship partners, selectively attend to information consistent with a positive view of 
each other, and construct narratives that discount negative aspects of the relationship and 
augment positive ones (Karney, McNulty, & Bradbury, 2001). These motivated 
cognitions increase team members’ perception that their relationships are positive and 
facilitate an esprit de corps that solidifies their identification with the relationship 
(Roberts, 2006). They can foster identification through an “us versus them” mentality 
(Hill & Levenhagen, 1995). Finally, communal schemas and the social support they 
engender may facilitate a positive rather than negative emotional response to the stresses 
of entrepreneurship by granting entrepreneurs with a sense that they have the resources 
they need to cope effectively with the challenges they face (Rindova & Petkova, 2007). 




increases the value and significance of group membership (Pratt, 2000). These arguments 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Communal schemas among entrepreneurial team members are positively 
associated with identification with the team. 
Obligations 
Despite their positive effects, communal schemas by themselves are not enough 
for the development of relational capital, as they can reduce obligations to the team. 
Communal schemas can lead team members to overestimate the extent to which they 
think alike (Watson et al., 1995). They perceive less uncertainty about the motives and 
mental models of the other team members and assume that their affinity in the social 
realm translates to similarity in opinions in the task realm (Hogg & Terry, 2000). As a 
result, they may refrain from holding explicit conversations about their behavioral 
expectations from each other. Explicitness is one of the conditions that increases 
behavioral commitment (Salancik, 1977) and without it, the level of obligations on the 
team will be lower. For example, the team may decide to work on their business plan and 
assign different sections to various team members but, given their assumption that 
everyone is on the same page, may not be explicit about what each part of the business 
plan should include, by when it should be completed, or even what they mean by the term 
“business plan.” As a result, there will be less commitment to produce the document in a 
way that meets others’ expectations. Unlike clans (Ouchi, 1977) or strong cultures 
(O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996), entrepreneurial teams do not attain agreement by 




Thus clarity can only be attained by holding explicit conversations with direct sharing of 
diverse views, which is less likely to happen when a team is highly communal. 
Communal schemas can reduce obligations even as it increases trust and 
identification. Entrepreneurial team members may be highly motivated, but in the 
absence of clarity and accountability, their relationship will be characterized by low 
levels of obligations. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3: Communal schemas among entrepreneurial team members are negatively 
associated with felt obligations on the team.  
 The above arguments suggest that entrepreneurial teams that characterized only 
by communal schemas may not develop the three types of relational capital that they need 
to succeed. As I argue below, contracting practices can supplement communal schemas 
for relational capital development in entrepreneurial teams. 
CONTRACTING PRACTICES 
Insights on the benefits of contracting practices in relationships come from 
research on inter-organizational alliances (e.g., Carson et al., 2006; Vlaar, Van den 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2006). Like entrepreneurial teams, they represent relationships that 
are neither hierarchy (i.e., the two firms are distinct entities rather than a single 
organization) nor market (i.e., the interaction between them is embedded rather than 
arm’s length). In the words of Powell (1990: 301), “this patterned exchange looks more 
like a marriage than a one-night stand, but there is no marriage license, no common 
household, no pooling of assets.” Moreover, they share with entrepreneurial teams high 
mutual and joint interdependence, as well as uncertainty. As suggested by the results of 




Contracting is a behavioral practice that entails codifying and enforcing inputs, 
outputs, and behaviors, thereby producing a testament of the process. The testament can 
be either written or verbal; what matters is that there is explicitness and transparency 
about expectations from the other party (see also Vlaar et al., 2006). Like communal 
schemas, contracting practices reduce the bounds on interpretative and behavioral 
options. Contracting practices provide direction for people about what they need to do, 
thereby replacing an organizationally-given structure (Sine et al., 2006). The power of 
contracting practices is not necessarily their legal enforceability, because most are 
actually too incomplete to constitute legal safeguards. Thus contracts are not inherently 
obliging. Rather, contracting practices are a dynamic mechanism for clarifying and 
elaborating objectives and responsibilities (Carson et al., 2006). They stimulate 
conversations that create shared meaning where there is none by focusing partner’s 
attention on the same issues, forcing articulation of opinions, and instigating and 
maintaining interaction about how the company should be run (Vlaar et al., 2006). 
Contracting also creates rules or guidelines for action. Although these rules are dynamic 
and continuously modified, at any given moment they serve as templates for planning and 
accomplishing tasks (Desanctis & Poole, 1994). Like communal schemas, contracting 
practices are a matter of degree. The more complex the contracting practice, the more 
elaborate the process of joint problem solving and the greater the specification of 
promises and processes for settling differences of opinion (Carson et al., 2006; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). 
Entrepreneurs may be motivated to engage in contracting practices as their 




in systematic cognitive processing and counterfactual thinking (Baumeister, Vohs, 
DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). The emotions associated with the uncertainty of new venture 
formation, whether positive, such as hope, or negative, such as fear or worry, likewise 
motivate systematic cognitive processing to improve understanding what is happening in 
the current situation and perceived ability to predict what will happen next (Tiedens & 
Linton, 2001). Contracting can be a way for entrepreneurial team members to address this 
need for greater certainty.   
Most entrepreneurial teams engage in some form of contracting, as when defining 
the ownership of the firm. But contracting practices can also be used more extensively in 
the team’s day-to-day operations. For example, at the end of their weekly meetings, a 
team can put into writing what each person had agreed to do, along with a target date to 
do it by, thereby making explicit their goals and commitments and plans for achieving 
them, rather than agreeing in more general terms (or not conducting weekly meetings at 
all). These examples correspond to the task description aspect of contracting (Argyres, 
Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007). Detailed contracting around how the entrepreneurial teams’ 
relationships will end and how they will handle possible conflicts of interest later on, for 
example in a detailed “Operating Agreement,” is another means of generating explicit 
conversations about these issues. Operating Agreements include details guidelines about 
how the new venture will be managed, how major decisions will be made, and how 
dissolution will be handled. This second practice of contracting, contingency planning, 
outlines how partners will deal with problematic contingencies that might arise, such as 





Examples of entrepreneurs engaging in these practices abound, including those 
presented in Chapter III. Likewise, from the very beginning, the founders at Vermeer 
adopted the practice of turning their ideas into written commitments. As Forgaard said, 
“What I tried to do was bring the ideas down to the ten-thousand-foot level by producing 
a document that enumerated the features we would like” (Mahmood & Nanda, 1997: 3). 
In its early years, Federal Express was loosely structured and “titles were virtually 
meaningless.” Yet the founding team held  weekly meetings to coordinate their activities 
in which they would set goals and follow up on them, spend time on schedules, uncover 
reasons for delays, and discussing alternative approaches to meeting objectives. 
According to founding team member Roger Frock, these practices injected some 
discipline into the young organization (Frock, 2006).  
CONTRACTING PRACTICES AND RELATIONAL CAPITAL 
Contracting practices have important implications for relational capital 
development in entrepreneurial teams by structuring team members’ interpretations and 
actions regarding managing the new venture, as elaborated below.  
Obligations 
Contracting practices force relationship partners to articulate, deliberate, and 
reflect on their goals and needs for the new venture (Beck & Kieser, 2003; Vlaar et al., 
2006). The greater the extent of interaction generated by contracting, the greater the 
feeling of interacting parties that they should comply with the terms agreed upon. This 
greater sense of obligations arises not because of the legally binding aspect of the 
contracts, as they are too incomplete to constitute legal safeguards. Rather, the greater 




commitments. The explicitness, publicness, and irrevocability of stated intentions 
articulated in the contracting process increase people’s behavioral commitment to follow 
through (Salancik, 1977).  
Contracting practices facilitate collective sensemaking of the new venture’s 
ambiguous task and help team members make sense of each other. Specifying a basic 
division of responsibility and accountability increases the likelihood that entrepreneurial 
team members know how others on the team will handle certain contingencies (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; March & Simon, 1958). Thus contracting practices increase both clarity 
about how to manage the new venture and agreement about it between entrepreneurial 
team members. They serve as substitutes for precedent, providing clarity where there is 
none and protecting the team from detrimental mistakes and misalignments. 
 Indeed, studies have demonstrated that when groups are uncertain about how to 
organize, time spent communicating about goals and ideas improves group functioning 
(Ericksen & Dyer, 2004). Even when partners have previous experience with the 
situation, they may contract because their past experience taught them the benefits of 
contracting practices. Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer (2007) found that in the inter-firm 
context, as two partners contracted over time, they tended to include more, not less, 
provisions specifying plans for various contingencies. These arguments suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Contracting practices among entrepreneurial team members are positively 





Contracting practices can facilitate the formation of a shared identity. Contracts 
codify a group boundary through the creation of explicit legal, financial, and social 
boundaries and thereby facilitate greater levels of identification within the team (Kogut & 
Zander, 1996). As Aldrich (1999: 161) writes, “Organizational emergence is marked by 
organizational boundaries coming into focus. With definite boundaries, an organization is 
no longer merely an aggregation of individuals. In their organizationally-defined roles, 
people now constitute an entity that differs radically from the accumulation of individual 
self-interests.” Contracts are an articulation of that emerging boundary and thus are 
conducive to the development of identification (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
 Contracting practices can alleviate the negative effects of lack of structure on 
identification by facilitating convergence on shared meaning about the company. In a 
recent study, Hogg et al. (2007) found that when people are uncertain about themselves in 
a social situation, they prefer to identify with, and identify more strongly with, groups 
that are more distinctive, more clearly structured, and associated with clearer prototypes. 
Such groups have “high entitativity” and are thereby more effective at reducing 
uncertainty. Contracting increases the entitativity of the startup, thereby increasing its 
attractiveness as a target of identification. Specifically, the interactions about and 
definition of the nature of the organization creates a more crystallized identity and a sense 
of how it is distinct from others (Albert & Whetten, 1985). For example, The Prediction 
Company was founded in 1991 and uses chaos theory to develop automated trading 
systems. As told in The Predictors, the discussions among the founders of company 




what kind of company they were going to be – an investment firm, a software company, 
or a division of a large bank. At the end of the discussion they had converged on a 
common vision for their identity and affirmed their commitment to it (Bass, 1999). 
Likewise, Vermeer Technologies held weekly meetings where everyone made explicit 
their commitments to perform certain tasks and reported progress on those tasks. As one 
the team member said, “This is a device to get the momentum and positive feeling going 
and ensure that the right hand knows what the left hand is doing. Besides, the meetings 
are the only mechanisms that make us all feel that we are part of one company. They 
build a sense of community among the engineers (Levenson & Nanda, 1997: 2).” Thus 
contracting provides an alternative path to identification where market-based novelty 
strips new ventures of opportunities to attract identification through their external image. 
Thus,  
Hypothesis 5: Contracting practices among entrepreneurial team members are positively 
associated with identification with the team.  
Trust 
Like communal schemas, however, contracting practices are insufficient, by 
themselves, for building relational capital in entrepreneurial teams. Within teams, 
contracting can undermine trust. Contracting in the absence of communal schemas can 
undermine trust in others’ motives and goodwill, for example, by leading people to 
attribute others’ cooperation to the constraints imposed by the contract rather than to 
internal motivations (Kollock, 1994). Although contracting can increase cognitive trust, 
or calculus-based trust, which is grounded in the belief that others will do as expected 




benevolent intentions and value-congruence. Contracts can increase the perception of 
social distance between team members and increase the salience of impersonal aspect of 
their relationship relative to interpersonal aspects (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Thus,  
Hypothesis 6: Contracting practices among entrepreneurial team members are 
negatively associated with trust on the team. 
Figure 4.1 is a representation of the hypothesized effects of communal schemas 
and contracting practices on trust, identification, and obligations. 
 
FIGURE 4.1 




COMBINING COMMUNAL SCHEMAS AND CONTRACTING PRACTICES 
There are several reasons to believe that combining communal schemas and 
contracting practices is beneficial for building relational capital in entrepreneurial teams. 
First, either one by itself can be insufficient and even dysfunctional. For example, 
entrepreneurs pursuing only contracting without communal schemas in the “built to flip” 




and move on. They engaged in elaborate contracting around their exit strategy (Collins, 
2000). Many of these teams imploded before they could realize the gains of their ideas 
and market opportunities, perhaps because the absence of caring inhibited the 
development of strong and resilient relationships. At the other extreme, entrepreneurial 
teams who re-create family-like patterns of relating with non-family members and in 
which agreements are informal rather than contractually recorded have been shown to 
suffer from the perils of free riding, unfulfilled promises, and other manifestations of lack 
of obligations (Kerra, Tracey, & Phillips, 2006).  
Contracting practices without communal schemas means that team members have 
structured their behavioral commitment but have not solidified as a team characterized by 
strong emotional connections. Team members may be more likely to walk away from 
such teams. Communal schemas without contracting practices mean that despite caring, 
the team is unprepared for difficult junctures ahead. They may have solidified their 
interpersonal bonds, but are not bound by commitments.  
Contracting practices also can serve as a platform upon which entrepreneurs can 
leverage the benefits of communal schemas, and vice versa. Apparent opposites can be 
mutually reinforcing (Clegg, Vieira, & Cunha, 2002). Thus when enacted with communal 
schemas, contracting practices do not necessarily undermine trust. They mean, rather, 
that entrepreneurs acknowledge the complexity of their situations. Their attribution for 
contracting is the situation, not suspicion about the motives of their team members. As a 
result, entrepreneurial team members need not worry as much about actually enforcing 
the contract (Dyer & Chu, 2003). At the other end, when communal schemas are enacted 




Contracting is a practice that enables communal partners to hold “difficult” or 
“uncomfortable” discussions (Vlaar et al., 2006). As a result, their relationship is of a 
higher quality, as it is more robust to various contingencies, can support discussions of a 
broader range of issues, and is resilient in the face of setbacks (Dutton & Heaphy, 2003). 
These ideas are summarized in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7a: The interaction of communal schemas and contracting practices among 
entrepreneurial team members is positively associated with trust. 
Hypothesis 7b: The interaction of communal schemas and contracting practices among 
entrepreneurial team members is positively associated with identification. 
Hypothesis 7c: The interaction of communal schemas and contracting practices among 
entrepreneurial team members is positively associated with obligations. 
The perspective presented here differs from much of the literature on control 
within organizations, which do not treat communal schemas and contracting practices as 
coexisting (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). The unique features of team-based new 
ventures, where high personal stakes co-occur with high task and environmental 
ambiguity, make both communal schemas and contracting practices necessary. Moreover, 
at the startup phase, there is no past, no precedent, and no existing social structure. The 
entrepreneurial team is the organization. As a result, team members need to cultivate both 
the team and its ability to function as an organization. Communal schemas enable 
entrepreneurs to be a team rather than a collection of individuals in the sense of being 
integrated and connected to each other (Hambrick, 1994). Contracting practices enable 




action (Thompson, 1967). Both are ways of structuring their relationships, thereby 
compensating for entrepreneurial teams’ lack of an exogenous social structure.   
RELATIONAL CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM PERFORMANCE 
Below I develop hypotheses regarding particular aspects of entrepreneurial team 
performance impacted by the relational capital build through communal schemas and 
contracting practices. Previous research on entrepreneurial team performance has 
conflated team performance with venture performance (e.g., Amason et al., 2006; Birley 
& Stockley, 2000; Ensley et al., 2002; Rueber & Fischer, 2002; Watson et al., 2003). 
Here I aim to examine more proximal outcomes of relational capital on the team, namely 
team process quality, to gain a more fine grained understanding of how entrepreneurial 
performance is affected by relational capital.  
Three types of team processes are particularly beneficial in entrepreneurial teams: 
creativity, resilience, and coordination. Creativity is the production of novel, useful ideas 
or problems solutions (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005). Because new ventures 
are in the business of creating something new, the ability of the entrepreneurial team to 
be creative is particularly important for their success. Indeed studies find that creativity 
engenders positive evaluations it receives from stakeholders. For example, Rindova, 
Petkova, & Kotha (2007) found that new firms that introduced novel product and service 
features generated positive evaluations from the media.  
Relational capital on the entrepreneurial team is hypothesized to facilitate 
creativity. Walter and Bruch (2008) recently reviewed the evidence on emotions in 
groups to argue that high-quality interpersonal relationships within work groups promote 




members’ positive affect. This positive affect in the group, in turn, increases the group’s 
creativity by broadening cognition and increasing the group’s repertoire of ideas and 
possibilities (Amabile et al., 2005; Fredrickson, 2001; Walter & Bruch, 2008). Trust and 
the openness it promotes also facilitate the generation of ideas for creativity (Isaksen & 
Lauer, 2002; Madjar, Oldham, & Pratt, 2002). Identification promotes creativity by 
increasing mutual support and collective problem-solving, as team members focus on 
their collective goal (Orr, 1990). Finally, obligations provide a minimal structure by 
ensuring that team members know what is going one with each other’s activities. The 
minimal structure serves as a platform for creativity to take place (Kamoche & Cunha, 
2001). Together, the three forms of relational capital increase the entrepreneurial team’s 
generativity, or its ability to create, transform, or otherwise expand its resource options 
for coping with the problems it faces (Dutton & Glynn, 2007).  
Resilience is the capacity to rebound from adversity strengthened and more 
resourceful (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). Resilience is an important quality for 
entrepreneurial teams, as they are likely to face numerous road blocks, failures, and 
disappointments. Promises of funding fall through, technological launches fail, 
competitors reach the market first, or progress takes more time and money than 
anticipated. Entrepreneurs have no slack resources and experience these near-disasters as 
stressful, as they reduce their perceived ability to cope with their situation (Rindova & 
Petkova, 2007). For example, when Federal Express was first founded, the hub-and-
spokes idea was novel and initially ridiculed as impractical. “Existing regulations 
prohibited this form of nationwide delivery service, experts considered it a financial 




Federal Express experienced many difficulties, repeatedly coming within an inch of 
failure because of dwindling financial resources and unforeseen events (Frock, 2006). 
Yet the founding team was able to be resilient in the face of these obstacles, kept on 
trying, and persevered to bring the company to success. 
The support, encouragement, commitment, and cohesion associated with 
relational capital on the team facilitate the ability of the team to rebound from adversity. 
These qualities of relationships increase the team’s perceived efficacy or ability to cope 
with their stressful circumstances, thereby facilitating a positive emotional response to 
challenges (such as hope) rather than a negative one (such as frustration) (Rindova & 
Petkova, 2007). Trust, identification, and obligations provide a basis for taking risks in 
coping with adversity, thereby facilitating resilience. For example, at one point in Federal 
Expresses’ early history, when it had just about run out of money, Fred Smith, Federal 
Express’s founder, took the last of the young company’s money to Las Vegas and 
gambled all night. He made enough to last them until their next round of funding (Frock, 
2006). This resilient response was facilitated by his team members’ trust in him to do 
what is right for the company. Identification fosters resilience by tying the success of the 
venture to individual’s own perceived success, thereby increasing their motivation to 
keep going rather than give up. Obligations facilitate resilience because they lead people 
to commit to do whatever it takes for the firm to succeed. For example, when the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 destroyed the workplace of a large investment bank, 
traders who had previously earned eight-figure salaries became clerks or manual 




Stark, 2005). Their sense of obligation toward each other underlay their willingness to do 
work for which they are overqualified. 
Coordination is the extent of consistency and coherence in organizational 
members’ work activities (Cheng, 1983). High-quality coordination is necessary for 
entrepreneurial teams to perform well in light of the complexity and ambiguity of their 
situation (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Eisenhardt, 1989b). Entrepreneurial teams need to 
respond quickly and flexibly to dynamic and turbulent environments and the limited 
resources available to new ventures mean that entrepreneurial teams cannot afford 
misalignment in their actions (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). Yet 
attaining a high level of coordination is a non-trivial endeavor given the lack of social 
structure in entrepreneurial ventures to align people’s behaviors. People may differ 
substantially in their interpretation of their situation and their perception of what is the 
appropriate response. As a result, their behaviors and actions are unlikely to converge.  
Trust, identification, and obligations facilitate coordination by increasing team 
members’ knowledge about each other’s activities and thus their ability to align with 
these activities. Trust means that individuals have a sense of the other’s motivations and 
behavioral tendencies (Mayer et al., 1995), which enables better anticipation and 
response to their actions. Identification means that team members share certain premises 
for decision making, and thus are likely to respond to a given contingency in the same 
way (Simon, 1991). This predictability facilitates coordinated responses, even in the face 
of novel circumstances. Obligations also increase predictability, as people know that 
others will follow through with their promises. They also increase people’s willingness to 




more likely to respond to each other’s actions with a “yes-and” response, building on 
rather than blocking each other’s ideas and actions (Weick, 1998). The enhanced 
interpersonal knowledge associated with these forms of relational capital facilitate mutual 
adjustment for coordination (Gittell, 2006). It also enables team members to take each 
other’s perspective and thereby anticipate the behavior and reactions of others (Galinsky, 
Ku, & Wang, 2005). In support of this logic, it is known that lack of perspective-taking is 
particularly harmful to coordination, as people are unable to abandon their own 
perspective in interactions with others from different disciplines (Heath & Staudenmayer, 
2000). 
In sum, I propose the following hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
relational capital and new venture performance: 
Hypotheses 8a-c: Trust between entrepreneurial team members is positively associated 
with (a) creativity, (b) resilience, and (c) coordination. 
Hypotheses 9a-c: Identification with the entrepreneurial team is positively associated 
with (a) creativity, (b) resilience, and (c) coordination. 
Hypotheses 10a-c: Obligations between entrepreneurial team members are positively 
associated with (a) creativity, (b) resilience, and (c) coordination. 
Combining the hypotheses presented thus far yields the theoretical framework 
presented in Figure 4.2 below. As is apparent from the figure, communal schemas and 
contracting practices are hypothesized to improve team process quality through their 
impact on relational capital. Thus,  
Hypotheses 11a-c: (a) Trust, (b) identification and (c) obligations mediate the 




Hypotheses 12a-c: (a) Trust, (b) identification and (c) obligations mediate the 
relationship between communal schemas and resilience. 
Hypotheses 13a-c: (a) Trust, (b) identification and (c) obligations mediate the 
relationship between communal schemas and coordination.  
Hypotheses 14a-c: (a) Trust, (b) identification and (c) obligations mediate the 
relationship between contracting practices and creativity. 
Hypotheses 15a-c: (a) Trust, (b) identification and (c) obligations mediate the 
relationship between contracting practices and resilience. 
Hypotheses 16a-c: (a) Trust, (b) identification and (c) obligations mediate the 
relationship between contracting practices and coordination. 
FIGURE 4.2 
Hypothesized Relationships between Communal Schemas, Contracting Practices, 
Relational Capital, and Team Process Quality 
 
 
 
